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Abstract
A unique dataset of social and economic networks collected in 60 rural Gambian
villages is used to study the ways in which households with links outside the village
(a proxy for market connections) behave in the locally available exchange networks
for land, labor, input and credit. The econometric results at both household and
link (dyadic) level provide evidence of: (i) substitutability between internal and
external links, and (ii) substitutability between internal reciprocation and external
links. These findings provide support for the transformation process of primitive
economies described in a long tradition of anthropological work as well as recent
theoretical models.
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“The pattern of symmetrical and reciprocal rights is not difficult to understand if we
realize that it is first and foremost a pattern of spiritual bonds between things which are
to some extent parts of persons, and persons and groups that behave in some measure as
if they were things.”
Mauss (1923, “The Gift”)
1 Introduction
The aim of the present paper is to contribute to the empirical analysis of the process of
transformation in traditional rural societies using a network perspective. Using a unique
database of economic networks (land, labor, inputs and credit) collected in 60 villages in
rural Gambia, where traditional non-monetary economic exchanges -gift economy- pre-
vail, the behavior of households involved in market transactions is studied.
The transition from primitive economic activities to more complex exchanges that
eventually lead to market economies (or to alternative modern economic systems) was a
relevant element in the conception of classical economic theory and a key issue for early
economic sociologists, as can be seen in the works of Thorsten Veblen, Max Weber and, in
particular, Karl Polanyi. In the latter’s conception of the great transformation, modern
societies are shaped through the transition from a network of communitarian recipro-
cal exchanges to institutionalized market interactions (Polanyi, 1944). The concept of
primitive economies as reciprocal exchanges is largely based on Malinowski’s influential
description of the production system of the Trobriand islanders (Malinowski, 1921, 1922),
which also provides the foundation for Mauss’ analysis of a gift economy.
The transformation process is subsequently formalized by Kranton (1996). In her
model, agents can choose either reciprocal exchanges with other agents whose prefer-
ences, production costs and other relevant characteristics are known, or market trans-
actions with anonymous agents, using money as a medium of exchange. If the cost of
searching for trading partners is higher than the benefit obtained from consumption di-
versification offered by markets, then agents will prefer reciprocal exchanges. One of the
main results of Kranton (1996) is that reciprocity can be enforced even if markets exist as
an alternative for transactions. In particular, she predicts that reciprocal exchanges will
be pervasive in settings such as the Gambian villages, where common features of rural
societies are predominant, namely high costs to access market exchanges, non-anonymity
(therefore high value on the future utility from a relationship), and homogeneous con-
sumption preferences.
The descriptions of ethnographic and anthropological literature and the predictions of
models a la Kranton (1996) have not been matched with rigorous quantitative evidence
about the transformation process.1 Most of the empirical evidence of behavior under
different levels of market exposure has been collected through experimental games across
different societies. A robust finding, replicated in experiments played in different groups
and contexts, is that communities more exposed to market are fairer in transactions with
1A summary of studies focusing on the influences of markets on behavior and preferences is provided
by Bowles (1998). More related to the framework of the present study, Barrett (2008) reviews the
literature related to market participation of smallholders in Africa.
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strangers, as measured by the amount of money offered in the ultimatum game and the
dictator game (Henrich et al., 2004 and Henrich et al., 2010). Indirectly, this result im-
plies that individuals belonging to groups that participate in the market are less likely to
get involved in reciprocated transactions. In other words, the difference between gift and
commodity exchange is that a gift establishes a feeling-bond between two people, which
is absent from a commodity transaction (Hyde, 1983).
Following the contribution of Kranton & Minehart (2001), I will consider a market
as a network of buyers and sellers that establish a link between each other. The data
from Gambian villages provide information regarding the existence of a link connecting
a particular household for a transaction outside the village in each network. While most
of the households in the data have at least one economic link with their fellow villagers
(and in most cases several links), only a few households have links outside the village. I
consider these outside links as a proxy for a market connection, an assumption supported
by observations on the field and by empirical tests provided below. On the other hand,
and in line with previous studies described in the next section, the economic links within
the village are assumed to represent some kind of gift exchange.
Another important assumption behind the study is the idea, first formalized by de Jan-
vry et al. (1991), that the problem of missing or failing markets may be better under-
stood as a household instead of a commodity specific phenomenon. Even if markets exist,
transaction costs that exceed the utility gain from the transaction will push a particular
household outside the market. Moreover, there are general equilibrium effects, in which
failures of an important market, such as credit, labor or food, can lead to exclusion from
exchanges in other markets. While the predictions of de Janvry et al. (1991) are not
directly tested, the concept of household-level market exclusion is adopted.2
For the empirical analysis, two specific hypotheses derived from previous descriptions
of the transformation process will be explored: (i) Substitutability between internal and
external exchanges, i.e. households with external economic links are less likely to be in-
volved in economic interactions within the village; and (ii) reciprocation versus market,
i.e. households with external economic links are less likely to be involved in reciprocated
exchanges with fellow villagers. Network based measures of degree centrality (number of
links in each network) and reciprocity are used to quantify economic interactions inside
the village. The relationship of these variables with external economic interactions is ana-
lyzed in various empirical specifications. Firstly, the predicted probability of external link
existence is used to implement a propensity score matching estimator to compare a set of
households with similar observed characteristics. The analysis at the household-level is
expanded by implementing a specification in the spirit of the recent contributions of Kr-
ishnan & Sciubba (2009) and Banerjee et al. (2012), where variables gleaned from network
measures are included into a linear model. Taking advantage of the network structure of
the data, the main hypotheses are further tested at the dyadic (link between households)
2Most of the previous applied econometric studies specifically dealing with the issue of market par-
ticipation are efforts to test models in the spirit of de Janvry et al. (1991). Goetz (1992) combines
bivariate probits and 2SLS in a sample of Senegalese rural households and finds some differences in the
determinants of grain market participation for buyers and sellers. Using structural estimation, Key et al.
(2000) show the importance of transaction costs in data for Mexican ejidos. Bellemare & Barrett (2006)
use an ordered Tobit model to show the sequentiality in the decisions of market entry and volumes to
be transacted for rural households in East Africa.
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level, following the specification first proposed by Fafchamps & Gubert (2007).3
In all the econometric specifications I find support for the main hypotheses. External
links are negatively related to household degree, and therefore there is evidence of sub-
stitutability between internal exchanges and external links. This effect is observed only
within each network and not across networks. In terms of the reciprocation versus market
hypothesis, the analysis also provides evidence of less reciprocated exchanges for house-
holds with external links, again mainly within each network, but also across networks
in some cases. These results are generally robust to the different econometric specifi-
cations and alternative methods to control for village- and household-level unobserved
heterogeneity, but the effects are not always present for every network. The findings
are suggestive in terms of providing empirical evidence for the hypotheses using detailed
network data. However, they should not necessarily be interpreted in causal terms given
potential endogeneity problems that might remain unsolved with the techniques that the
data allow me to use.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the setting and
data collection. In section 3 formal definitions of the network measures are presented.
Section 4 introduces the empirical strategy and presents the main empirical results. A
final section suggests policy implications of the findings and concludes.
2 Context and Data
2.1 Setting: economic exchanges in rural Gambia
The setting of the study largely resembles the characteristics of rural West Africa. Gam-
bian villages are mostly engaged in basic subsistence agriculture, combined in some cases
with cash crop production -mainly groundnuts- with the use of basic technologies (Gajigo
& Saineb, 2011). Some villages also rely on fishing and livestock rearing as complementary
economic activities. In the small villages in which the surveys were conducted kinship
relationships are very common and are usually dominated by the lineage of the village
founders and the oldest settlers. The village is organized into compounds, a group of
huts surrounded by a grass fence where members of the same family live and organize
daily activities together. The majority of labor activities are carried out by compound
members organized in one or more dabadas or farm production units (Webb, 1989). Most
of the time a compound can be identified as a household, but in some cases there are
members identified as independent households inside the compound.4
While many of the production activities are organized within the compound, there
is also an active exchange with other households in the village, mainly through non-
monetary transactions embedded in the traditional social norms and a network of recip-
rocal exchanges.5 As described by Shipton (1990) “in The Gambia, virtually everything
3To my knowledge, the only study that analyzes reciprocity in rural societies in a dyadic framework
is the recent contribution by Schechter & Yuskavage (2012).
4A detailed description of the organization of activities within compounds is provided by Carney &
Watts (1990) and von Braun & Webb (1989).
5The most active period of economic exchanges between households in the village occurs before,
during and after the rainy season.
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is lendable and at times will be lent. This includes nearly all factors of agricultural pro-
duction land, labor, livestock, seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, and farm tools. Craft tools,
vehicles, and household goods are also lent”. For the present study these exchanges are
grouped in four networks -land, labor, inputs (basically tools, seeds and fertilizers), and
credit- described in detail below.
Formal land titles are very rare in rural Gambia. Instead, the unwritten rights over
land usage are determined by the descendants of the village’s founders, generally the
village chief (Alkalo) and his direct relatives. In some cases, the kabilo (clan) heads, who
might not be related to the founder’s lineage but represent the descendants of other early
settlers, are entitled to permanent usage rights. As noted by Webb (1989), the rights over
land are closely related to the old social structure, with the former highest castes having
the most productive plots. All other villagers must borrow plots on either a seasonal or
an annual basis from them, in agreements that can also last for several years (Chavas
et al., 2005). Sometimes other individuals own small plots of land outright that can be
lent or rented, usually to individuals outside the village.
In terms of labor exchanges between villagers, to deal with a shortage of family workers
(particularly before and during the rainy season) households usually invite other villagers
or outsiders to help with household tasks in exchange for various kinds of goods, labor
or even a marriage arrangement. Other alternatives available in some villages are the
use of kafos, an organized workforce of villagers from various households who participate
in the provision of public goods but who can also be hired for a fixed wage, and the
use of strange farmers (Swindell, 1978), individuals from outside the village who provide
part-time labor in exchange for the right to use part of the family plot for their own
benefit. In the villages surveyed, the hiring of kafos was rarely observed (less than 1% of
the interviewed households heads declared they borrowed labor from more than 5 other
households) and the use of strange farmers cannot be identified due to data limitations.
The input network is defined in the survey as exchanges of means of production that
imply a monetary or opportunity cost for the lender, such as tools, cattle, fertilizer, seeds
and the like. Livestock are usually lent for milk, manure and transport during long pe-
riods, and sometimes also lent to relatives outside the village, as a means of avoiding
the loss of an entire herd in the case of disease or theft (Shipton, 1990). As for other
agricultural inputs, the lending can take the form of a bilateral household exchange or a
centrally organized process by some of the villager groups. The external links relate to
the acquisition and distribution of these inputs from and to other villages, rural markets
or urban centers.
The credit exchanges between villagers generally follow the Islamic prescription of not
charging any interest rate to the borrower, and are related to risk-sharing activities of
support for relatives and friends, enmeshed in the network of mutual obligations created
by the other types of economic and social exchanges (Shipton, 1990). Therefore, these
exchanges must be understood as quasi-credit, as defined by Platteau & Abraham (1987)
and Fafchamps (1999). Apart from the direct borrowing of money from another house-
hold in the village, there is also the possibility of obtaining credit from external sources,
both informal and formal (mainly rural development banks or microcredit agencies), or
from some village-level rotating saving and credit associations (ROSCAs), locally known
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as osusus. Other forms of organized saving, such as the money-keepers and the village
bank, are usually available.
2.2 Data collection and description
The data were collected by the author, other researchers, and local collaborators in the
context of the baseline survey for the impact evaluation at national level of a Community-
Driven Development Program, conducted between February and May of 2009. 60 Gam-
bian villages with populations between 300 and 1,000 inhabitants, mainly in rural areas
(just 4 villages are in semi-urban areas), were randomly selected using area sampling at
the ward level, a smaller geographical division that tends to be homogeneous in geograph-
ical but heterogeneous in socio-cultural terms.
The methodology adopted for the present study differs from that of traditional house-
hold surveys in which a random sample of households is collected in each village. Struc-
tured group interviews geared to collect quantitative information were implemented in-
stead.6 Therefore, village censuses were carried out through gatherings co-organized
with the Alkalo and district-level officers. In such village meetings it was possible to ob-
tain relatively coarse quantitative information -with a particular focus on socio-economic
interactions- for almost all households in each village (the median village-level coverage
rate is 94%).7
These type of group surveys have the advantage to minimize recall bias, since other
members of the group will help to answer the questions. A potential problem is, therefore,
that the measurement error could be correlated with the composition of the group. This
is likely not to be the case in our data for two reasons. Firstly, the groups were randomly
formed by the enumerators based on the village taxation list. Secondly, while a typical
group in this surveys was formed by five to eight persons, many persons from the com-
munity were present in the village gatherings where these open surveys were conducted,
and it was common that persons outside the group contributed to clarify data that were
incomplete or doubtful. Another concern with these open surveys is that individuals may
not be willing to reveal some information in front of the community. This is improbable
in the setting in which we conducted the survey, where at least the information related
to our main questions (links in the economic networks) was usually observable for com-
munity members and therefore common knowledge and not sensitive information, as we
could confirm during the pilots and the data collection.8 Even though information about
economic interactions was likely to be revealed in front of the community, it is possible
6This type of approach is common in ethnographic research and is related to the rapid rural appraisal
methodology that has been successfully used in the past for quantitative analysis in different disciplines
(Chambers, 1994)
7Having census network data implies that in the empirical analysis there is no need for the adjustment
in the estimates that are necessary in sampled networks proposed by Chandrasekhar & Lewis (2011).
8During the pilots we were initially reluctant to ask information about credit links (money exchange),
thinking that it might be perceived as being disrespectful and that this information would not be revealed.
On the contrary, it was found that villagers were in general willing to respond to this questions. The clue
to understand this behavior was given by one of the local enumerators: “In Islam there is no interest
rate. If you lend money it means that you are helping at the moment when the other really needs it, so
you are doubly blessed. While usually lenders will not reveal the information, grateful borrowers will.”
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that other kind of information, in particular about income, was more sensitive. Fortu-
nately, from the village taxation list we were able to obtain objective measures of wealth.
The survey, which was answered by the head of the household,9 has two sections: a
standard (and very lean) household questionnaire designed to collect a vector of household
characteristics and a set of questions specifically designed to understand the economic
networks in the village. For the latter, the respondents were asked to name villagers
with whom they and other members of their households had exchanges, during the past
year (therefore from the end of the 2008 dry season to the end of 2009 dry season), in
terms of (i) land, (ii) labor, (iii) inputs, and (iv) credit. We also collected information
about networks created by kinship and marriages and, importantly for the purpose of the
present study, about connections external to the village in each of these networks.
We finally interviewed 2,886 persons, but the sample is reduced to 2,810 when incom-
plete data are removed. In Table 1 the main variables of the household questionnaire are
summarized. Average household size is 12.7 members, but some households have even
more than 50 members (approximately 1% of the sample) a fact explained by the polyg-
amous nature of Gambian rural society, with 45% of households declaring to have more
than one wife. Only a very small number of household heads are females (7%) or non-
Muslims (4%). 16% of the respondents declared having some kind of formal education
(although a substantial fraction of the villagers received some kind of koranic education
and usually master basic Arabic language skills) and the average (self-declared) annual
income per capita is 3,565 Gambian Dalasis, which corresponds to approximately $380
(in constant 2005 and PPP adjusted dollars from World Development Indicators), with
only around 12% of this income stemming from agricultural activities. Around half of
the respondents declare to have current or former household members who work outside
the village, including 19% who receive remittances from overseas migrants outside Africa.
41% claim to produce some sort of cash crops.
Figure 1 presents a graphical representation of the network data for one of the villages,
where the four economic networks are considered jointly. It is possible to see that the
whole village is linked with economic interactions, with the exception of five households
that are in autarky (the five isolated nodes in the upper left corner). The numerous links
of economic interactions within the village is further confirmed in the descriptive statis-
tics for the data on networks of all the villages displayed in Table 2. These data support
the idea that most of the economic interactions take place within the village instead of
outside it. When the four economic networks are taken together (fifth row of Table 2), it
can be seen that 76% of the households do not have any links that enable them to bring
something from outside the village and 83% do not have links that enable them to send
something outside the village (columns 3 and 4 respectively). On the other hand, only
less than 15% of the households declare having no links in these networks with fellow
villagers (internal autarky).
More details related to the data collection methodology, as well as an extensive anal-
ysis of the data can be found in Arcand et al. (2010) and Jaimovich (2011).10
9In some limited cases the household head was absent and his or her replacement answered the
questionnaire.
10Jaimovich (2011) is a working paper largely based on chapters of my PhD dissertation. Some of the
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While this database is unique in many aspects, there are limitations that constrain
the possibilities of the empirical analysis. In the first place, the data are available only for
one period, therefore only a cross-sectional analysis is possible. In particular, dynamic
features in household’s behavior can not be captured, limiting the observed economic in-
teraction inside and outside the village to those that have taken place in the year before
the survey. Another issue with the data is that the relevant unit for economic exchanges
is the household, therefore the complexities of intra-households allocation of resources
are not captured and the external exchanges of others members apart from the household
head can be misrepresented.
3 Definitions: Network measures.
3.1 Internal exchanges
Each household will be considered as a node i in each of the m economic exchange net-
works, with m = {LAND,LABOR, INPUT,CREDIT}. The internal exchanges consist
of a set of nodes in each village v belonging to nv = 1, ...,Nv where nv is the number
of households inside each village. The existence of a link between households i and j
in the network m will be measured as a binary variable `ij(m) which takes value one if
a link is reported in the data and zero otherwise.11 `ij(m) is a directed link from i to
j, which implies that the former lends m to the latter. If the opposite is true (i bor-
rows from j), then the link will denoted as `ji(m). Following this definition, it is possible
to see that in the network shown in Figure 1, household D is lending labor to household C.
While the data do not provide information in terms of the specific type of exchange
that a link implies, I will consider that a link in the network of internal economic ex-
changes represents some kind of gift exchange. This assumption is largely supported by
the description of the economic activities presented in section 2.1, as well as the anecdotal
observations during the fieldwork.
A basic metric of the level of internal exchanges of a node i in a network m is its
degree centrality, di(m), measured as the number of links involving this particular node.
In the data it is possible to make a distinction in terms of the directionality of the link.
If the link goes from i to j, then it will be counted in the measure of the out-degree:
douti (m) = ∑j `ij(m), which is related in the economic networks to the position as a
lender. When the link goes in the other direction, from j to i, it will be counted as
part of the in-degree of i: dini (m) = ∑j `ji(m), which is therefore a characteristic of i as
borrower.
The first panel of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the average degree of the
households in the sample, both as borrowers and as lenders. The average degree for the
economic networks is always below 1, indicating that for many households di(m) = 0 (in-
ternal autarky). This fact is captured in the fourth panel of Table 2, which indicates that
results discussed there are also reported in the present study.
11A link is recorder in the data if at least one of the two villagers of the dyad mention the existence of
a link.
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between 40% and 50% of the households do not have any links for each specific network.
Among the networks, INPUT has households with higher degree and CREDIT with
lower, but these differences are not statistically significant given the large variation in the
distribution of degrees.
3.2 Reciprocity
One of the main characteristics of tribal or primitive economies, as described by Ma-
linowski (1921) and Mauss (1923), is the reciprocity of exchanges. Reciprocity can be
defined in various ways, but basically is linked to the concept of non-pecuniary transac-
tions in which the provision of a good or service is expected to be rewarded in the future.
This reciprocity can be expected in the long term, particularly in villages such as those
in the present study, where social relations are long-lasting. This is a limitation for the
cross-sectional data used in the empirical analysis, but at least it is possible to observe
whether an economic exchange was reciprocated within the year before the survey was
conducted.
I will limit myself to the description of reciprocity within the m economic networks
for which detailed information is available. Given that the data about links are directed,
it is possible to observe whether any specific link has a counterpart in the opposite di-
rection. If a link is bidirectional, meaning that the lender was also a borrower in a
transaction with a given household, this link will be considered as reciprocated. In partic-
ular: Recipij(m) = 1⇔ `ij(m) = 1 and `ji = 1, where `ji is a link between i and j in any
of the m networks. Therefore, reciprocation can exist within the same network or with
another network. For example, in Figure 1 households A and B have a reciprocal link
to exchange inputs, while households C and Alkalo have a reciprocated link in which the
former lends labor and the latter land.
As in the case of household degree, the reciprocal relation is directional. For each
household i, reciprocal out − degree is defined as Recipouti (m) = ∑j `ij(m)`ji. Similarly,
reciprocal in − degree is defined as Recipini (m) = ∑j `ji(m)`ij.
The second panel of Table 2 shows a general description of the reciprocal degree of
households in the sample, taken as a percentage of household’s degree in each network. It
is possible to see that many of the internal exchanges were reciprocated within the year
of the study. INPUT is the network with more reciprocation, with an average of close
to half of the links, followed by LABOR, where nearly 35% of the links are reciprocated.
In the case of LAND and CREDIT , on average approximately 20% of the links are
reciprocated.
3.3 External connections
The existence of an external link in each of the m economic networks is reported in the
data, but not the identity and location of the specific agent with whom villagers have
it. Neither the intensity of the link nor the existence of more than one external link
in each network are reported. Given these limitations of data, the external link will be
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taken as a binary variable Exti(m) = 1 if an external link is reported and zero otherwise.
A distinction will be made in terms of external links created to bring something to the
village (Extini (m)) or to take something out something from the village (Extouti (m)).
Even though the specific characteristics of the external connection cannot be identi-
fied in the data, I will consider the external links as a proxy for a link to a market outside
the village. The idea is that economic exchanges outside the village are more likely to
be established between anonymous agents, with the purpose of expanding the available
set of production inputs or diversifying consumption, and, even if no money is used as
a medium of exchange, involving relative prices agreed by the agents. This assumption
is supported by the evidence presented below, given that household-level variables such
as number of emigrants, remittance reception, and marriages with outsiders are uncor-
related with the probability of having an external link. On the other hand, households
involved in the production of cash crops are more likely to have external connections.
Informal interviews in the field as well as reports provided by the local enumerators also
confirm that this assumption is likely to be true.
In the third panel of table 2, Exti(m) is summarized. The description is consistent
with the idea that only few economic transactions occur outside the village. Only 24%
of the households have an external-in link and 17% an external-out in any of the four
economic networks (fifth row of table 2). In the case of LAND, 5% of the households give
out plots to outsiders, while 8% get land from other villages. For LABOR, the database
only has information about the households with members working outside the village.12
Just 3% of the households work outside the village. For the links in the INPUT network,
8% of the respondents declared getting input from outsiders, just 3% to give out. A simi-
lar disproportion is observed for CREDIT , where 12% obtained money from outside the
village and just 5% acted as money lenders.
4 Empirical analysis
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to test the transformation process of rural
economies that are exposed to the possibility of more complex types of exchanges outside
the village. Using the detailed database about network of economic exchanges described
above, two hypotheses of the transformation process will be tested: (H1 ) Households with
external economic links are less likely to be involved in economic interactions within the
village (substitutability between internal and external exchanges); and (H2 ) Households
with external economic links are less likely to be involved in reciprocated exchanges with
fellow villagers (reciprocation versus market hypothesis).
This section proceed as follows. Firstly, the households characteristics correlated with
the existence of a link to economic exchanges outside the village are analyzed. Afterward,
12The lack of information related to external hiring is unfortunate, because the use of strange farmers
is an important way of dealing with labor shortages (Swindell, 1978). In terms of the definition of
households working outside the village, the original question was “Did you, or any members of your
household, work for other households during the last year (2008-9)? If yes, how many days?”. Only
households that worked at least one week during last year outside the village are considered as having
an external link.
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evidence regarding the two aforementioned hypotheses is presented. A first subsection
compares the network degree and the reciprocal degree of households with and without
external connections, showing that the former tend to have lower means for both variables
when the group of comparison is created using a propensity score matching. The next
subsection provides further evidence with respect to the two hypothesis with household-
level OLS estimation of linear models. Finally, the analysis at the link-level is presented,
with dyadic regressions which results are also in line with the predictions of H1 and H2.
4.1 Who has external connections?
The data described in Table 2 shows that few villagers have external links. Therefore the
question arises, who are these villagers? In order to understand which household-level
characteristics are related to the the probability of Extiv(m) = 1, the following model is
estimated:
Pr(Extiv(m)) = G(αv +Xivβx) (1)
where the dependent variable can be a link to bring something to village v (Extiniv(m))
or to take out something/someone outside (Extoutiv (m)). In addition to the probability of
an external link in each of the m networks, the probability of an external link in any of
the economic networks will be estimated. G(⋅) is the logistic function and Xiv is a vector
of controls at the household level. To control for village-level unobserved heterogeneity,
in all the estimations village fixed effects are included (αv).13
The results of the estimation of Equation 1 are presented in Table 3, where only
variables that are interesting from an economic perspective and which are statistically
significant are shown. Household size is positively associated with the existence of an
external link for most networks. The level of education of the household head is nega-
tively correlated with external links in some networks. For instance, the result in column
5 suggests that educated individuals are less likely to work outside the village, a result
that can be explained by the fact that those who have the comparative advantage of
basic education inside the village tend to work there. Income per capita increases the
probability of external exchanges only in terms of credit. Ethnic minorities (in this case
considered as those that represent an ethnic group which constitutes less than a third
of villages’ population) are more likely to get land and work outside the village. Older
households are less likely to give credit.
Traditional roles are very important in rural Gambia, reflecting the importance of
social norms. The Alkalo is more likely to lend land and inputs outside the village, while
the members of the Village Development Council (VDC, an important organization that
coordinates the most important village groups) also have a higher chance of exchanging
land and receiving credit from outside. Nevertheless, households that are relatives of the
Alkalo are less likely to be involved in external credit, a fact probably related to their
favorable position for accessing cash inside the village. The Imam, village religious leader,
13Given the dependent variable is binary, the estimated coefficients can suffer the incidental parameters
problem. One alternative to solve this concern is the use of the conditional likelihood function estimator,
that in this case will take the form L =∏60v=1 Pr (Ext1v,...,Extnv∑ni=1Extiv ). In the Appendix (Table B.1) is shown
that estimating Equation 1 with this specification barely change the results.
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is less likely to work outside the village but has a higher probability of giving out inputs.
The results in Table 3 provide support to the idea that the external links in the four
economic networks are a proxy for market exchanges, where interactions with anonymous
agents prevail. All the variables measuring the existence of relatives and friends outside
the village -as is the case for number of emigrants, the reception of remittances and
marriage exchanges outside the village (to bring and send family members)- are either
statistically insignificant or have a negative coefficient as determinants of the probability
of an external link.14 Additionally, households that produce some kind of cash crop,
and therefore are more likely to be involved in market exchanges, indeed have a higher
probability of an external link (even though this is not always statistically significant).
4.2 Descriptive statistics and propensity score matching
A direct implication of H1 is that households with economic links outside the village
should have a lower degree (di(m)) in the networks of internal economic exchanges. Ta-
ble 4 shows the differences in the mean degree in all economic networks and in each
network individually (for both dini (m) and douti (m)) between households with external
links m (Exti(m) = 1) and those without external links (Exti(m) = 0). The rows la-
beled as simple show the average degree and a t-test of the difference between both kinds
of households. It can be seen that the differences are statistically significant in various
networks, but no clear trend is observed in terms of which kind of household has higher
degree. For instance, in the case of Extouti , the in-degree is higher on average for house-
holds with external links in the LAND network, while the opposite is true if out-degree
is considered.
The simple mean comparison is not informative given the set of households with and
without external links are unlikely to be directly comparable due to differences in their
characteristics. A first approach to address this concern is to create a balanced compar-
ison group with respect to observable household characteristics. In order to do this, I
use the predicted values from Equation 1 as propensity scores to match households with
similar probability of having an external link. For each i with Exti = 1 a comparison
group is estimated using households without external links which have a close propensity
score. This is implemented only in the subgroup of observations that are in the common
support of the propensity scores.15 In the rows labeled as matched of Table 4 the dif-
ference between the average degree for the groups of households with Exti = 1 and the
estimated comparison group is shown only for the subsample of observations that are in
the common support of the propensity score. It is possible to see that thirteen of the
eighteen differences in mean are negative when the matched groups are considered (only
four differences are statistically significant, all of them when dini is considered because the
dispersion of the data is larger in the case of douti ). This result provides initial evidence
14The only exceptions are for input given out in the case of the coefficient for Extiniv (MARRIAGE)
and labor for the coefficient of Extoutiv (MARRIAGE)
15For the main results, the k -nearest neighbors matching estimator is reported, with k = 3 (Abadie
et al., 2004), and the standard errors are bootstrapped to take into account the fact that values are
estimated. If different number of k are used or if the kernel matching estimator is implemented instead,
the results (available upon request), even though different in magnitude, have a similar interpretation.
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in favor of H1. 16
In the case of H2 the prediction is that household with external links will have a lower
reciprocal degree. In Table 5 the differences in reciprocal out− degree (Recipouti (m)) and
in − degree (Recipini (m)) are compared between households with and without external
links, in both the original and the matched comparison group. The upper panel of Table
5 shows that no significant differences are found when Exti, a link in any network, is
considered. This is in contrast to the results of the lower panels of Table 5, where it is
possible to see that the differences are significant when reciprocation within each network
is analyzed. In the case of Extini , most of the differences are significant or close to signifi-
cant and always negative. In the case of Extouti , only the difference for Recip
out
i (LABOR)
is significant, and also negative.17 The results in Table 5 offer initial evidence of the re-
duction in reciprocity under the influence of external connections.
If the creation of an external link is completely determined by the household char-
acteristics included in Equation 1, then the results for the matching estimators can be
taken as the causal estimate of the average treatment effect of Exti(m) = 1 on house-
hold’s degree and reciprocal degree. Nevertheless, it is likely that unobservable household
characteristics jointly determine the dependent variables as well as the existence of an
external link. Given this concern, the results must only be interpreted as the differences
in di(m) and Recipi(m) for a set of households with and without external links that are
comparable according to observable characteristics.
4.3 OLS estimates at the household level
To further analyze H1 at the household-level, I will follow Banerjee et al. (2012), in their
reduced-form specification, by using measures of network centrality in a linear specifica-
tion of the following form:18
div(m)
nv − 1 = αmv +Xivβmx +Extiv(m)βmext + eiv, (2)
where the dependent variable, household’s degree, is expressed in terms of the total
possible links that a household can have in each village v.19 The vector of coefficients of
interest is βmext, associated with the dummies capturing the existence of an external link
in each network m (Extiv(m)). In particular, if there is substitutability between div(m)
and Extiv(m), it is expected that βmext < 0. Village-level fixed effects (αv) are included,
as well as Xiv, the vector of household-level characteristics already described above. eiv
16In appendix table B.2 it is shown that when the existence of an external link in any of the four
economic networks is considered, the differences in degree are never statistically different in the matched
samples. This is also the case if the degree in networks other than the ones with external degree are
considered, as shown in appendix B.3.
17The differences in Recipi(m) for networks others than the one with the external link, no significant
results (with very few exceptions) are found, as reported in appendix table B.4.
18Banerjee et al. (2012) use the eigenvector centrality in their study of microfinance diffusion in Indian
villages, and show that their results are different if degree centrality is used instead. This is the case
given their data are for (subsamples) of networks with many more nodes than the network data from
Gambian villages. Given networks are much smaller for the latter, and therefore indirect connections
are not so relevant, eigenvector and degree centrality are very similar (Borgatti, 2005).
19If instead div(m) is used as dependent variable, the main results are unchanged.
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is the disturbance term.
The βmext coefficients from the OLS estimation of equation 2 are displayed in Table 6.
20
In the upper panel, Extini (m) and Extouti (m) are defined as variables taken value 1 if there
is an external link in any network, while in the lower panel the external links are defined for
each separate network m. The results in Table 6 are very much in line with those obtained
from the comparison of matched samples in Table 4: external links tend to be negatively
related to household’s internal degree within each network m, but unrelated in the rest
of the networks. βext is negative for LAND, except in the Extouti (LAND)-douti (LAND)
combination, for LABOR only in the Extouti (LABOR)-douti (LABOR) combination, for
INPUT always except in Extouti (INPUT )-douti (INPUT ) and for CREDIT only in
Extini (CREDIT )-dini (CREDIT ). Given the mean values of div(m)n−1 (last row of Table
6), the existence of external links is associated to a reduction on internal degree which
ranges between 4% and 50%.21
Even though in the estimation of the parameters of equation 2 a series of household
level controls are included, it is still possible that unobserved characteristics are related
to the existence of links in both internal and external networks, and therefore the esti-
mates would be bias given this potential endogeneity problem. Therefore, in order to be
conservative, the magnitudes of βmext must be taken as the conditional correlation between
internal degree and external connections. Nevertheless, if the unobserved variables affect
degree and external links in the same direction, then the bias in the estimates will be
upwards and the sign of the coefficients in Table 6 is correct, with magnitudes that are up-
per bounds of its true value (in appendix section A this argument is formally explained).
This would be the case if the unobserved variables are related to characteristics as en-
trepreneurial ability, empathy or assiduousness. A better way to deal with the problem
of unobserved heterogeneity at household level is present below, since in the estimations
using link level data it is possible to include household fixed effects.
In the same spirit of Equation 2, the relationship of reciprocation and external con-
nections (H2 ) is tested using the following specification:
Recipiv(m)
div(m) = αmv +Xivβmx +Extiv(m)βmext2 + eiv, (3)
where the dependent variable is the proportion of reciprocated links over the total
links of households i in network m.
20To account for the fact that observations are likely to be correlated within each village, the standard
errors are clustered at the village-level.
21A potential concern with the estimation of Equations 2 and 3 is the fact that the dependent variable
is a fraction that can take values between 1 and 0, but the predicted values from an OLS estimation can
lie outside this interval. To check if this poses a problem, I will follow Papke & Wooldridge (2008) in
implementing a version of these equations with a probit specification estimated using quasi-maximum
likelihood and controlling village unobserved heterogeneity by using the Mundlak-Chamberlain device.
Therefore, instead of the αv vector, the average of all the village-variant variables (Xv and Extv) are
included. Using this specification has no effect on the interpretation of the main results when compared
to the OLS estimates, in terms of the sign and statistical significance of βext, and therefore I will prefer
the OLS estimation which coefficients are easier to interpret (the results of the Mundlak-Chamberlain
estimates are reported in the appendix tables B.5
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The results of the OLS estimation of Equation 3, only for βmext2, are reported in Table
7. Apart from the estimation of Recipouti (m) and Recipini (m), the proportion of total
reciprocated links over total degree, Recipi, is also reported in the third column of each
network. The results are in line with the preliminary evidence from Table 5. Most of
the statistically significant coefficients are negative, and this particularly the case when
external links exists in each particular network. For LAND and CREDIT , βext2 is neg-
ative for Extiniv(LAND) = 1 and Extiniv(CREDIT ) = 1 , while for LABOR and INPUT
this is the case when Extoutiv (LABOR) = 1 and Extoutiv (INPUT ) = 1. Additionally, in the
lower panel of Table 7 can be seen that there are some cross-networks effects of external
links, given that some of the coefficients for networks others than the dependent variable
are statistically significant, always with a negative sign (excepts for Extoutiv (CREDIT )
in LAND).22
The same concerns as before, in terms of a bias in the OLS estimations given unob-
served heterogeneity, are valid in the case of the coefficients displayed in Table 7. Next
subsection presents an alternative to deal with this issue.
4.4 Dyadic regressions: internal exchanges
So far, network based variables have been aggregated at the household level, therefore
missing part of the richness of these detailed data. In order to better understand the
transformation process at a more disaggregated level, the variables related to the proba-
bility of a link will be explored. In the case of H1, the formation of a link `ij(m) with a
fellow villager is estimated using the following dyadic model:
`ijv(m) = G(αv +wijvβdyad +Extijvβextdyad + (Xiv +Xjv)βsum + ∣Xiv −Xjv ∣βdif) (4)
where the dependent variable is the undirected binary measure of a link between i and
j (therefore in this case `ijv(m) = `jiv(m)).23 To preserve symmetry on the right-hand-
side, I follow Fafchamps & Gubert (2007) by specifying: βdif as the coefficient associated
with the absolute value of the difference in attributes between i and j and βsum to the
sum of their attributes (for variables like household size, head’s age, income, etc.), and
βdyad as the parameter associated with the variable wijv that corresponds to common
characteristics of i and j (like kinship and ethnic group). As for the coefficient associated
with Extijv (βextdyad) two kinds of dummies are included: One Extij(m) when only one
household in the dyad has an external link, and Two Extij(m) when this is the case for
both (therefore the comparison group is dyads without external links).24
The dyadic framework is also helpful for dealing with the problem of potential bias in
the estimation given omitted observed and unobserved household characteristics. Since
every household i can have links with many fellow villagers j, it is possible to include
22In Table B.6 of the Appendix is possible to see that the main results do not change if the fractional
linear model is estimated using the specification of Papke & Wooldridge (2008).
23The directed probability of link formation can also be estimated, but given the interest in this case
is to study the existence of an economic exchange within the village, the undirected measure has a more
direct interpretation
24In these estimations, the disturbance terms are allowed to be correlated across observations involving
the same individual using the two-dimensional clustering methodology proposed by Cameron et al. (2011)
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household fixed effects. Including αi directly in Equation 4 may imply the potential prob-
lem of incidental parameters, namely the inconsistency in the estimation of the household
fixed effects can be ‘transmitted’ to inconsistency in the estimation of the other parame-
ters. One alternative to address this issue is the estimation of the conditional likelihood
function, as proposed by Chamberlain (1980), that in this case will take the following
form:
L = nv∏
i=1 Pr (`1jv(m), ..., `nvjv(m)∑nvj=1 `ijv(m) ) , (5)
that can be estimated only for the sub-sample of households where ∑nvj=1 `ijv(m) ≠ 0,
therefore those with at least one link in each network.25
The estimation of the βextdyad parameters of Equation 4 are presented in Table 8.
The first panel shows the logit estimation (DYADIC LOGIT) and the second panel the
estimation using the conditional likelihood function of Equation 5 (DYADIC CONDI-
TIONAL LOGIT). It can be seen that, even the sample size is not the same, both models
yield very similar results. And these results tend to provide support to H1 given that
all the estimated βextdyad are negative when external links within the same network are
considered, with the exception of the case of CREDIT . It is also possible to see some
effects across networks, given that βextdyad for other networks than m are also significant
in some cases, with not clear prediction regarding the sign.
It is not possible to directly compare the results from the household-level estimates
and those from the dyadic model, but the fact that the negative effect of external links
on internal economic interaction is present in both specifications provides further ev-
idence that omitted household-level unobserved characteristics do not necessarily drive
the results. Nonetheless, it cannot be ruled out that in the dyadic specification household-
pair-level unobservables are introducing biases in the estimates.
4.5 Dyadic regressions: reciprocity
Aggregating reciprocation data to the household-level hides important link-level hetero-
geneity. Table 9 presents a detailed summary of all the links registered in the four
economic networks, with particular attention to the fact if the link was reciprocated or
not (Recipij(m)). The information is disaggregated according to: whether the household
that formed the link has external links or not; whether each link was formed to borrow
out or lend in within the village economic networks; and whether the link was estab-
lished between households that are close relatives (family) or not. Around 65% of the
links described in Table 9 are formed by households that do not have any external link
(Exti(m) = 0). These households also have more reciprocated links. When links with
all the villagers are considered, households without external links reciprocate around half
of the links while those with external links only reciprocate between 41% to 43%. The
only exceptions are households that are external lenders and internal borrowers, which
display even more reciprocity than those only exchanging internally (53.5%). When links
25There are 2,828 links for LAND, 3,546 for LABOR, 5,401 for INPUT , and 2,598 in the case of
CREDIT .
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are divided between exchanges within and ouside the family, it is possible to see that
the differences in reciprocity are mainly associated with the former group. Links with
relatives are reciprocated more than half of the time, but more intensively for households
with only internal links. On the other hand, the level of reciprocation is similar for all
groups if links with non-relatives are considered.
In Table 10 the link summary is presented by network. The external links are consid-
ered only in the case a household has links outside the village in each particular network
m. LAND and CREDIT are reciprocated in less than 30% of the cases on average, while
LABOR and INPUT have reciprocation in around half of the links. The latter networks
are actively reciprocated within the same network, among them and also with LAND
and CREDIT . In terms of the differences between links created by households with and
without external links, the previous evidence is confirmed in various combinations: links
created by the former group are, in general, reciprocated less. This is particularly the
case when the external link is created to bring something to the village, and the effects
are more pronounced for the LABOR and INPUT networks.
In order to further explore the descriptive evidence in terms of less reciprocated links
for households with external connections (H2 at the link-level), the following dyadic
model is estimated:
Recipijv = αv +wijvβdyad +Extijvβext2 + (Xiv +Xjv)βsum + ∣Xiv −Xjv ∣βdif + ijv (6)
where Recipijv = 1 if households i and j, from village v, have a reciprocated link, and
Recipijv = 0 if the link between i and j is non-reciprocated. This specification differs
with respect to Equation 4 because those dyads without a link (that represent around
99% of the sample) are not considered. Otherwise, the right hand side variables are all
symetric and expressed in a similar fashion as in the dyadic Equation 4. Of particu-
lar relevance is the fact that wijv variables, including kinship, are controlled for, given
the evidence from Table 9 that most reciprocate exchanges are within the extended family.
Table 11 displays the coefficients obtained for βext2 in the dyadic model of Equation 6.
Some of the findings obtained for the household-level results in Equation 3 are confirmed
at the link-level. For various specifications, the probability of creating a reciprocated link
is negatively related to Extijv. βext2 < 0 for LAND and CREDIT when Extinijv is consid-
ered, and for INPUT when Extoutijv is taken into account (in the case of the latter, only
significant at the 12% level). It is interesting that the effect is particularly pronounced
in those networks where reciprocation is less prevalent (Table 10), a fact that may be
related to endogenous preferences and cultural norms.26
5 Conclusions
A long tradition of anthropological studies have described the characteristics of primitive
economies based on reciprocal exchanges, known as gift economies, and how this type of
26Given very small within household variation in terms of the partners, it is not possible to estimate
Equation 6 using conditional logit.
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transaction tends to be reduced when more complex exchange mechanisms exist. This
transformation process is formalized in the model introduced by Kranton (1996). Nev-
ertheless, little rigorous empirical evidence has been provided to support the qualitative
evidence and the predictions from the model. In order to fill this gap, the present study
takes advantage of a unique dataset of social and economic networks collected in 60 rural
Gambian villages to analyze the ways in which households with links outside the village
(interpreted as a proxy for market connections) behave in the locally available exchange
networks for land, labor, input and credit.
The main results, from econometric specifications at both household- and dyadic-level,
provide evidence supporting the predictions of the transformation process. In particular,
it is found that: (i) households with external economic links are less likely to be involved
in economic interactions within the village (substitutability between internal and external
exchanges); and (ii) households with external economic links are less likely to be involved
in reciprocated exchanges with fellow villagers (reciprocation versus market hypothesis).
In the case of the substitutability between internal and external exchanges, the results
are mainly driven by within-network effects, given that cross-network coefficients are sta-
tistically insignificant (e.g. an external link in the network of inputs of production is a
substitute of an internal link in the inputs exchange but this is not the case for the other
economic exchange networks). In terms of reciprocation versus market, the analysis also
provides evidence of within-network substitution, but jointly with some cross-network
effects. The results are robust to different econometric specifications and alternative
methods to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the village- and household-level, but
the effects are not always present in every network.
The findings suggest some important policy implications. The goal of many rural de-
velopment programs is the integration of isolated communities into market transactions.
In other words, using a network framework, there is an effort to create external links
that connect currently missing markets. To explain why many of these programs fail,
theoretical models have proposed that the benefits of market transactions may not be
enough to abandon the traditional means of exchange and production (de Janvry et al.,
1991; Kranton, 1996). Therefore, it is necessary to consider the complexities of commu-
nity exchanges in order to understand the effects of market-oriented interventions. For
instance, von Braun & Webb (1989) and Carney & Watts (1990) have shown how in The
Gambia many programs that attempted to increase agricultural productivity and cash
crop production failed because the traditional distribution of land was not considered in
the design. The results I have presented suggest that the existence of external links is
related to a decrease in the exchanges within the village, and particularly of reciprocated
exchanges with fellow villagers. If policies oriented to the creation of external links are
implemented, undesired effects, such as the reduction in community interactions and the
isolation of villagers not willing to abandon the gift exchange system, can be the source
of renewed failures in attempts at rural development.
The study of the transformation of rural societies using a network perspective have
the potential to improve the understanding of the overall economic development pro-
cess. Exploring whether the results of the present contribution hold in different settings,
and improving data collection and analysis to overcome its limitations, represent fruitful
avenues for future research.
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Table 1: HOUSEHOLD DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS
Household Size 12.67 11.40 1 400
Age of household head 51.70 15.54 15 100
Female Household head 0.06 0.25 0 1
Formal Education 0.16 0.37 0 1
Compound head 0.84 0.37 0 1
Polygamous 0.46 0.50 0 1
Monogamous 0.48 0.50 0 1
Relatives in the village (%) 0.09 0.09 0 0.73
Non Muslim 0.04 0.19 0 1
Ethnic minority 0.19 0.40 0 1
Workers in the household 1.27 0.66 0 6
Agricultural land (hectares) 8.06 21.22 0 400
Land per worker (hectares) 2.27 7.40 0 133
Income per capita (GMD) 3,514 4,735 43 125,000
Agricultural income (% of total) 0.12 0.24 0 1
Emigrants 0.48 0.50 0 1
Cash crops sellers 0.41 0.49 0 1
Remittances receivers 0.19 0.39 0 1
VILLAGE ROLE
Alkalo 0.02 0.14 0 1
Alkalo’s relative 0.35 0.48 0 1
Alkalo’s assistant 0.04 0.20 0 1
VDC member 0.19 0.39 0 1
Elders council member 0.19 0.39 0 1
Traditional healer 0.20 0.40 0 1
Griot (storyteller) 0.01 0.12 0 1
Imam 0.02 0.14 0 1
Marabout 0.02 0.14 0 1
Note: Household-level descriptive statistics. 2,810 observations for each
variable. A fully detailed description of the variables can be found in
Jaimovich (2011).
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Table 9: LINKS SUMMARY: RECIPROCITY IN ALL ECO-
NOMIC NETWORKS
External links Exti(m) = 0 Extini (m) = 1 Extouti (m) = 1
Internal links Borrow Lend Borrow Lend Borrow Lend
LINKS WITH ALL VILLAGERS
Total links 4815 4528 1764 1879 1128 1383
Reciprocated 47.9% 50.9% 43.6% 40.9% 53.5% 43.7%
Non-reciprocated 52.1% 49.1% 56.4% 59.1% 46.5% 56.3%
LINKS WITH NON-FAMILY
Total links 2889 2712 1012 1069 676 845
Reciprocated 35.1% 37.4% 36.6% 34.6% 45.0% 36.0%
Non-reciprocated 64.9% 62.6% 63.4% 65.4% 55.0% 64.0%
LINKS WITH FAMILY
Total links 1926 1816 752 810 452 538
Reciprocated 67.0% 71.1% 56.3% 51.8% 66.4% 55.8%
Non-reciprocated 33.0% 28.9% 43.7% 48.2% 33.6% 44.2%
Note: Summary of all the links registered in the four economic networks
(LAND, LABOR, INPUT and CREDIT ). Based on 2,810 households.
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Table 10: LINKS SUMMARY: RECIPROCITY BY NETWORK
External links Exti(m) = 0 Extini (m) = 1 Extouti (m) = 1
Internal links Borrow Lend Borrow Lend Borrow Lend
LAND
Total links 1305 1228 71 49 38 137
Reciprocated with:
LAND 3.4% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 15.8% 4.4%
LABOR 10.2% 9.6% 4.2% 10.2% 0.0% 9.5%
INPUT 8.4% 8.2% 7.0% 4.1% 7.9% 10.2%
CREDIT 3.1% 3.7% 7.0% 0.0% 5.3% 1.5%
Non-reciprocated 74.9% 74.8% 81.7% 85.7% 71.1% 74.5%
LABOR
Total links 1664 1711 109 62
Reciprocated with:
LAND 7.1% 7.8% 16.5% 4.8%
LABOR 11.6% 11.3% 2.8% 4.8%
INPUT 20.3% 20.0% 12.8% 14.5%
CREDIT 8.0% 7.9% 5.5% 6.5%
Non-reciprocated 53.1% 53.1% 62.4% 69.4%
INPUT
Total links 2452 2396 183 184 61 125
Reciprocated with:
LAND 4.2% 4.3% 6.0% 6.0% 3.3% 4.8%
LABOR 13.4% 13.2% 10.9% 11.4% 8.2% 12.8%
INPUT 47.6% 48.7% 25.7% 25.5% 59.0% 28.8%
CREDIT 5.9% 6.3% 3.8% 3.8% 11.5% 2.4%
Non-reciprocated 28.9% 27.5% 53.6% 53.3% 18.0% 51.2%
CREDIT
Total links 1142 1046 94 173 60 83
Reciprocated with:
LAND 3.9% 4.0% 1.1% 2.9% 5.0% 1.2%
LABOR 11.0% 11.0% 6.4% 9.2% 15.0% 12.0%
INPUT 12.3% 12.6% 10.6% 8.1% 15.0% 15.7%
CREDIT 2.8% 3.1% 1.1% 0.6% 1.7% 1.2%
Non-reciprocated 69.9% 69.3% 80.9% 79.2% 63.3% 69.9%
Note: Summary of all the links registered in the four economic networks
(LAND, LABOR, INPUT and CREDIT ). Based on 2,810 households.
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Table 11: DYADIC REGRESSION FOR RECIPROCATED LINKS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Recipij(LAND) Recipij(LABOR) Recipij(INPUT ) Recipij(CREDIT )
One Extoutij (LAND) 0.146 0.127 0.297 0.065
(0.393) (0.289) (0.240) (0.364)
One Extinij (LAND) -0.570 -0.436 0.025 -0.281
(0.351) (0.309) (0.242) (0.381)
Two Extoutij (LAND) -0.519 0.469 0.776* 1.173
(0.896) (0.540) (0.420) (0.796)
Two Extinij (LAND) -2.074* -0.598 -0.259 -0.455
(1.237) (0.557) (0.562) (0.779)
One Extoutij (LABOR) 0.323 -0.001 -0.168 -0.169
(0.311) (0.239) (0.214) (0.309)
Two Extoutij (LABOR) -0.485 -0.054 0.065 0.022
(0.570) (0.655) (0.523) (0.795)
One Extoutij (INPUT ) -0.621 -0.252 -0.412 -0.027
(0.420) (0.300) (0.273) (0.393)
One Extinij (INPUT ) -0.036 -0.492* 0.133 -0.528*
(0.320) (0.276) (0.222) (0.315)
Two Extinij (INPUT ) 1.358** -0.578 -0.567 0.057
(0.655) (0.643) (0.589) (0.731)
One Extoutij (CREDIT ) 0.392 0.309 -0.143 0.029
(0.346) (0.244) (0.240) (0.369)
One Extinij (CREDIT ) 0.120 -0.098 -0.022 -0.775**
(0.275) (0.205) (0.168) (0.305)
Two Extoutij (CREDIT ) -0.098 -0.130 -1.127
(1.047) (1.089) (1.277)
Two Extinij (CREDIT ) 0.317 0.428 -0.171 -0.538
(0.539) (0.522) (0.511) (0.707)
Observations 1006 1162 1561 872
Households 704 780 972 575
PseudoR2 0.270 0.217 0.317 0.304
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Two-way (i and j) clustered standard errors in parentheses. Logit
estimates. Village dummies and other sums and differences of characteristics that were not statistically
significant or have limited interest were included in the estimations but their associated coefficients are not
reported.
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A Appendix: Potential bias of the linear model
The estimation of Equation 2 using OLS yields βmext that are consistent estimators of the
effect of external links on the degree of internal exchanges when cov(Extiv(m), eiv) = 0
and cov(Xiv, eiv) = 0. Nonetheless, it is likely that household unobserved characteristics
are related to the existence of links in both internal and external networks, and therefore
cov(Extiv(m), eiv) ≠ 0. If µi denotes the omitted variable, household level unobservable
characteristics, then the disturbance term in Equation 2 can be re-written as:
eiv = µiσ + uiv, (1)
where uiv is iid and σ is the coefficient that captures the effect of µi on the dependent
variable. In the case when Extiv(m) is one variable (to avoid assumptions related to the
covariances within Extiv(m) when taken as a vector), if the usual OLS assumptions hold
(including cov(Xiv, eiv) = 0) and Xiv relates to Extiv(m) only through its relationship
with unobservables, then plim β̂mext = βmext+σ cov(Extiv(m),µi)var(Extiv(m)) . Therefore, if it is expected that
µi will affect degree and external links in the same direction (σ and cov(Extiv(m), µi)
have the same sign), for example through entrepreneurial ability, empathy or assiduous-
ness, then β̂mext will be upward biased. In this case, if in the estimation of Equation 2
β̂mext < 0 is obtained, then βmext is indeed negative and the coefficient obtained is an upper
bound of its true magnitude. It is more difficult to think in terms of cases when it is
expected that µi affects internal and external exchanges in opposite directions (maybe
some kind of asymmetric information problem in which villagers know that i is dishonest
but people outside do not), but if this is the case then β̂mext will be downward biased and
when negative coefficients are found it is not possible to know if the sign is only due to
the bias or not.
The same concerns in terms of the endogeneity of the external links variables are valid
for Equation 3. The sign of the coefficients can only be interpreted in a causal way if
µi is correlated with both Recipi(m) and Extiv(m) in the same direction (and the other
assumptions stated above also hold), and consequently β̂mext2 < 0 is an upper bound of
the true unbiased value. It is again reasonable to expect that this assumption holds.
If the unobservable characteristics mentioned above are associated with the fact that a
household has an external link and also to a higher degree in the internal networks, it
is likely that, in the context of a gift economy, they also relate to active reciprocated
exchanges with fellow villagers. Nevertheless, if µi affects Recipi(m) and Extiv(m) in
opposite ways, the sign of the coefficients may be driven by the inconsistency of the es-
timators.
Ideally, an instrumental variable will be used to deal with this potential endogeneity
problem, but it is extremely unlikely to find in the data a household level variable zi
that will credibly meet the requirements of cov(zi, eiv) = 0 and cov(zi,Extiv(m)) ≠ 0.
Household-specific random effects are not feasible either, because the likely endogeneity
of the external links implies that it will be correlated with the random effects. Therefore,
if the expected result (βmext < 0) is obtained, its sign can be interpreted in a causal way
only if the assumption of unobservable characteristics to be related with internal and
external exchanges in the same direction holds.
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B Appendix: Robustness check for main results
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Table B.3: INTERNAL DEGREE FOR HOUSEHOLDS WITH AND WITH-
OUT EXTERNAL LINKS BY NETWORK (Difference in degree for networks
different than the one with external link. Only matched samples)
External in External out
Degree difference S.E. t-stat Degree difference S.E. t-stat
Exti(LAND)
d
in i
(m) LABOR 0.142 0.156 0.91 -0.156 0.170 -0.92INPUT -0.208 0.147 -1.42 -0.266 0.214 -1.24
CREDIT -0.027 0.105 -0.25 -0.023 0.090 -0.26
d
o
u
t
i
(m) LABOR 0.180 0.113 1.6 0.054 0.127 0.42INPUT 0.165 0.173 0.95 -0.051 0.239 -0.21
CREDIT 0.059 0.214 0.27 0.033 0.144 0.23
Exti(LABOR)
d
in i
(m) LAND 0.008 0.089 0.09INPUT 0.004 0.166 0.02
CREDIT -0.076 0.082 -0.92
d
o
u
t
i
(m) LAND 0.585 0.300 1.95INPUT 0.261 0.175 1.49
CREDIT -0.271 0.161 -1.68
Exti(INPUT )
d
in i
(m) LAND -0.044 0.079 -0.55 -0.017 0.096 -0.18LABOR -0.044 0.146 -0.3 -0.062 0.145 -0.43
CREDIT 0.037 0.062 0.59 -0.056 0.104 -0.54
d
o
u
t
i
(m) LAND 0.407 0.265 1.53 -0.005 0.241 -0.02LABOR 0.040 0.082 0.49 -0.087 0.133 -0.65
CREDIT -0.030 0.128 -0.24 -0.037 0.198 -0.18
Exti(CREDIT )
d
in i
(m) LAND -0.004 0.050 -0.08 -0.158 0.090 -1.76LABOR 0.002 0.085 0.02 0.146 0.189 0.77
CREDIT 0.101 0.084 1.21 -0.051 0.183 -0.28
d
o
u
t
i
(m) LAND 0.108 0.115 0.95 0.750 0.466 1.61LABOR 0.031 0.058 0.53 0.158 0.129 1.22
CREDIT 0.018 0.095 0.19 0.190 0.209 0.91
Differences in the average degree of households with and without external links and the
t-test of its difference when the comparison group is estimated using k -nearest-neighbor
matching estimator, with k = 3. Only observations on the common support of the
propensity score are considered and the standard errors of the estimated comparison
group are bootstrapped.
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Table B.4: RECIPROCATED LINKS FOR HOUSEHOLDS WITH AND
WITHOUT EXTERNAL LINKS BY NETWORK (Difference in reciprocal-
degree for networks different than the one with external link. Only matched
samples)
External in External out
Degree difference S.E. t-stat Degree difference S.E. t-stat
Exti(LAND)
R
ec
ip
in i LABOR 0.030 0.085 0.35 0.107 0.092 1.16
INPUT 0.002 0.135 0.01 0.168 0.160 1.05
CREDIT -0.015 0.048 -0.31 -0.016 0.050 -0.33
R
ec
ip
o
u
t
i
LABOR 0.000 0.065 0 0.047 0.072 0.65
INPUT 0.026 0.143 0.18 0.107 0.163 0.66
CREDIT 0.048 0.058 0.83 0.089 0.066 1.34
Exti(LABOR)
R
ec
ip
in i LAND -0.041 0.039 -1.07
INPUT 0.128 0.126 1.02
CREDIT -0.075 0.044 -1.72
R
ec
ip
o
u
t
i
LAND 0.077 0.070 1.1
INPUT 0.124 0.130 0.96
CREDIT -0.032 0.057 -0.56
Exti(INPUT )
R
ec
ip
in i LAND 0.015 0.032 0.48 -0.018 0.052 -0.35
LABOR 0.012 0.060 0.2 0.032 0.072 0.44
CREDIT -0.061 0.031 -1.94 -0.063 0.044 -1.42
R
ec
ip
o
u
t
i
LAND 0.047 0.058 0.81 -0.117 0.056 -2.08
LABOR -0.064 0.044 -1.45 -0.072 0.060 -1.2
CREDIT -0.051 0.038 -1.34 0.036 0.063 0.57
Exti(CREDIT )
R
ec
ip
in i LAND 0.021 0.026 0.81 -0.039 0.041 -0.95
LABOR 0.056 0.052 1.07 0.128 0.108 1.19
CREDIT -0.057 0.090 -0.63 0.104 0.152 0.69
R
ec
ip
o
u
t
i
LAND 0.058 0.041 1.43 0.179 0.091 1.97
LABOR -0.025 0.039 -0.62 -0.030 0.072 -0.41
CREDIT -0.033 0.093 -0.35 0.185 0.159 1.16
Differences in the average reciprocal degree of households with and without external
links and the t-test of its difference when the comparison group is estimated using k -
nearest-neighbor matching estimator, with k = 3. Only observations on the common
support of the propensity score are considered and the standard errors of the estimated
comparison group are bootstrapped.
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